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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a remarkably under-considered topic:
the potential impact of scientific discoveries and an
increased understanding of the biology of human behavior
on sentencing decisions in the criminal justice system,
specifically, the way that sentencing has the capacity to
rely on scientific evidence (such as brain imaging) as a
mitigating factor (or perhaps, in the mind of some, as an
aggravating factor) in determining punishment.
Such a new method of evaluating criminality, we argue,
can be beneficial not only for the defendant, but also for the
attorneys and judge involved in the case. If used properly,
it may help to provide a more truly objective set offactors
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that contribute to an individual's particular offending
patterns, rather than continuing reliance on sentencing
schemes that are swayed by societal bias and prejudice.
However, it can become problematic if a legal system relies
too heavily on untested theories, and even more
problematic in cases in which science does not support
legal conclusions. Scientifc discovery moves faster than
the law, and it is critical to make sure that the legal system
is given an opportunity to catch up, rather than risk
allowing 'Junk science" to influence how a defendant is
treated.
In this paper, we first examine criminal sentencing
procedures, and discuss how a criminological view of a
defendant's offending behavior can work to mitigate
harshly inappropriate sentences. In this context, we
consider how Federal Sentencing Guidelines cases
consider the significance of mental disability in sentencing
decisions, especially in the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker. Then we
review recent work on the biological bases of certain
criminal behaviors and how it can be captured through
brain imaging. Next, we consider how the use of such
evidence continues to expand in the criminal trial process.
Following this, we look at how the school of therapeutic
jurisprudence can better inform how the legal system
incorporates such evidence. Finally, we offer our
2016]
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recommendations for ensuring that scientific evidence is
introduced appropriately in the legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
T he most important change in the structure of the criminal justice
system in the past 40 years is in the area of sentencing. It is not
simply that sentences are longer, are more likely to be determinate, and are
more likely to be imposed for a far vaster range of crimes than were on the
books in the 1970's. 1 Those are all true, and are all extraordinarily
troubling, and have combined to make the criminal justice system far
"worse" (this descriptor cannot be accurately measured, but its point
should be clear). But, the single most important change in the law of
sentencing has been the adoption of sentencing guidelines with upward
and downward departures, and the concomitant requirement that judges
2
explain why they are imposing a sentence.
It comes as a surprise to many to learn that there were no published
opinions from any court in the United States about the reasons why a
certain sentence was being imposed before Judge Marvin Frankel's
3.magisterial opinion in 1976 in United States v. Bergman, in which Judge
Frankel relied heavily on section 7.01 of the Model Penal Code, in
imposing a four-month sentence on the defendant-who ran a chain of
1 See, e.g., PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND THE
REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 40 (1991) (describing changes to determinate
sentences); Sara Taylor, Unlocking the Gates of Desolation Row, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1810, 1813 (2012) (describing recent increase in number of crimes); Anne R. Traum,
Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 428 (2013) (describing length
of sentences).
2 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993)
(providing a political history of the enactment of the Federal Guidelines).
3 United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Our
sentencing system, deeply flawed, is characterized by disparity. We are to seek to
'individualize' sentences, but no clear or clearly agreed standards govern the
individualization. The lack of meaningful criteria does indeed leave sentencing judges far
too much at large.").
[Vol. 4:304308
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financially and morally corrupt hellish nursing homes, but who was never
convicted of any offenses arising from that criminal enterprise-for tax
fraud.4 Prior to the Bergman decision, in most jurisdictions, judges would
(maybe) say a sentence or two, mouth a platitude or two, and impose a
sentence that made sense to them but had no articulated penal or
criminological rationale.5 The irony of Bob Dylan's song Joey, about the
death of the mobster Joey Gallo, resonates:
"What time is it?" said the judge to Joey when they met
"Five to ten," said Joey. The judge says, "That's exactly
what you get.",
6
Bergman ushered in a new era in criminal sentencing. ' Courts,
legislatures, scholars, and policy "think tanks" began, for the first time, to
take seriously the whim and caprice of the sentencing process, a process
previously supported by no valid or reliable criminological research or
evidence. This led to the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 8 the
4 For considerations of the importance of the Bergman opinion, see Marc Miller,
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 453 (1992); Stith & Koh, supra note 2,
at 228; Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1011, 1022 n.73
(1991).
5 One of the authors (MLP) was a Public Defender in New Jersey from 1971 to 1974.
This was his experience, and it was in accord with the experiences of colleagues in other
states who reported precisely the same lack-of-explanations in the vast majority of their
cases.
6 BOB DYLAN, JOEY (Ram's Horn Music 1975). See Michael L. Perlin, Symposium,
Tangled Up In Law: The Jurisprudence of Bob Dylan, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1405
n.60 (2011) (discussing Joey in this context).
7 See generally Stith & Koh, supra note 2.
" The Commission was created as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991, 98 Stat. 1837, 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
991 (2012)). It was charged with designing a sentencing structure that would avoid
2016] 309
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adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 9 [hereinafter "Guidelines"]
(emulated subsequently by many, though not all states),10 and the Supreme
Court's controversial decisions in Mistretta v. United States (initially
making the Guidelines mandatory), 1 and, later, its decision in United
States v. Booker (subsequently making them advisory). 1 2
'unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 99 1(b)(1)(B).
9 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1-2 (2014).
10 Over half the states have adopted such Guidelines. See Marc L. Miller,
Symposium, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information
Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation ofReform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351,
1352 (2005); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, "'The Wisdom We Have Lost":
Sentencing Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361 (2005). See generally
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SENTENCING COMMISSIONS,
http://thenasc.org/aboutnasc.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016);
STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD LAW SCH., STATE SENTENCING
COMMISSIONS (2006), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc/sentencing/DanskyAug06-
sentencingcommissions.pdf; NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM (2008),
available at
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/StateSentencing Guidelines.ashx.
Some scholars have argued that states have adopted Guidelines in spite of the
Federal ones, not because of them. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in
Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED.
SENT'G REP. 69, 81 (2000) (" [S]tates have adopted guidelines despite the federal
example, not because of it."); Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, Symposium, State and
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 679-
80 (1992) ([S]tates have often overtly rejected guidelines that resemble the federal effort
and have relied instead on prior state efforts as a model.").
488 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1989).
543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). For a full survey of these developments, see United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1181-84 (llth Cir. 2010). See generally 3 MICHAEL L.
PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §
16-2.2 (3d ed. 2016).
[Vol. 4:304310
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This background introduces the issues we address in this paper.
Here, we focus on the potential impact of scientific discoveries and an
increased understanding of the biology of human behavior on sentencing
decisions in the criminal justice system. Specifically, we look at the way
that sentencing has the capacity to rely on scientific evidence (such as
brain imaging) as a mitigating factor (or perhaps, in the mind of some, as
an aggravating factor 13) in determining punishment. Remarkably, these
questions are still significantly "under the radar" for criminologists, that
cohort of experts that we might logically expect to be the most interested
in it. 1
4
In spite of Booker, a significant number of federal judges continue to make
sentencing decisions "as if they were still under the thrall of Mistretta. " Michael L.
Perlin, '7 Expected It to Happen/I Knew He'd Lost Control": The Impact of PTSD on
Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881, 886 &
n.28 (2015) (discussing research reported upon in Alison Siegler, Symposium, Rebellion:
The Courts ofAppeals'Latest Anti-Booker Backlash, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 201, 201-03
(2015)).
13 See Francis X. Shen, Sentencing Enhancement and the Crime Victim's Brain, 46
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 407 (2014). But see Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 113 MICH. L. REv. 607, 610-11 (2015) (recommending caution
when discussing emotional states or psychological diagnoses as tangible). For a
discussion of how the Guidelines have been misread to enhance certain offenders'
punishments, see Meghan Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL'Y 121, 132 & n.59 (2014).
14 Thus, a recent article revealed that a paltry 0.5% of all research articles in one of
the leading criminology journals over the prior nine years had dealt with questions of
biology or genetics. David J. Smith, Wider and Deeper: The Future of Criminology in
Europe, 11 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 3, 11 (2014). On the role of criminologists in the
courtroom in general, see DANIEL B. KENNEDY, CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM:
CONSULTING AND FORENSIC CRIMINOLOGY (Oct. 4-6, 2007), available at
www.forensiccriminology.com/pdf/AACS withpage_10.pdf (paper presented at the
annual conference of the Association for Applied and Clinical Sociology). On how
criminologists are "uniquely situated to create evidence-based knowledge to assist policy-
makers.., help close the justice gap," see Richard A. Leo, The Justice Gap and the
Promise of Criminological Research, 15 CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. & Soc'Y 1, 26
2016]
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Such a new method of evaluating criminality can be beneficial not
only for the defendant, but also for the attorneys and judge involved in the
case. If used properly, it may help to provide a more truly objective set of
factors that contribute to an individual's particular offending patterns,
rather than continuing reliance on sentencing schemes that are swayed by
societal bias and prejudice1 5 . However, it can become problematic if a
legal system relies too heavily on untested theories, and even more
problematic in cases in which science does not support legal conclusions.
Scientific discovery moves faster than the law,1 6 and it is critical to make
sure that the legal system is given an opportunity to catch up, rather than
risk allowing "junk science" to influence how a defendant is treated. 1 7
(2014); see also Roberto Catanesi & Giovanna Punzi, Evolution of Criminology, in
ORGANIZED CRIME, CORRUPTION AND CRIME PREVENTION 315, 315 (Stefano Caneppele
& Francesco Calderoni eds., 2014) ("Scientific research about the biological basis of
aggressive and criminal behaviors performed in the last few decades could change
modem criminology.").
Of course, in mitigation considerations in capital cases, these issues are regularly
considered. See, e.g., Valerie McClain, Elliot Atkins & Michael L. Perlin, "'Oh, Stop That
Cursed Jury": The Role of the Forensic Psychologist in the Mitigation Phase of the
Death Penalty Trial, in HANDBOOK ON FORENSIC SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 29, 32
(Mark Goldstein & Stephen Morewitz eds., 2013); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch,
The Death Penalty, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (Richard
Rosner et al. eds., 2016) (forthcoming).
15 See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 6-9
(1972).
16 See, e.g., Polina M. Dostalik, Embryo "'Adoption "? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the
Legal Consequences, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 867, 893 (2010-11) ("Science is
progressing faster and faster every day, but the law is not keeping up.").
17 On the impact of "junk science" in the future dangerousness inquiry of capital
sentencing trials, see Lisa Dennis, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibility: Assessing
Expert Predictions of Future Violence in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 292, 309 (2002). On the impact of allowing the use of "junk science" in
forensic expert testimony, see Paul Gianelli, Junk Science and the Execution ofan
Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 221, 250 (2013). On its impact on sex offender
[Vol. 4:304312
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In this paper, we first examine criminal sentencing procedures and
discuss how a criminological view of a defendant's offending behavior
can work to mitigate harshly inappropriate sentences. Then, we review
recent work on the biological bases of certain criminal behaviors and how
it can be captured through brain imaging. Next, we consider how the use
of such evidence continues to expand in the criminal trial process.
Following this, we look at how the school of therapeutic jurisprudence can
better inform how the legal system incorporates such evidence. Finally, we
offer our recommendations for ensuring that scientific evidence is
introduced appropriately in the legal system. 18
Since 2008, one of the authors (MLP) has written multiple articles
about neuroimaging in the context of the insanity defense, in the criminal
trial process in general, and in inquiries about whether a death row
cases, see Howard Zonana, Sex Offender Testimony: Junk Science or Unethical
Testimony?, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 386, 387 (2000). For an example of an
ongoing debate about the validity of a type of scientific evidence (deception detection
through neuroimaging), see Matthias Gamer, Mind Reading Using Neuroimaging: Is This
the Future of Deception Detection?, 19 EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGIST 172 (2014).
"' Beyond the scope of this paper is an analysis of cases and commentaries on the use
of such evidence in incompetency to stand trial proceedings, insanity defense cases and in
death penalty mitigation/clemency applications. See, e.g., Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d
518, 530 (Mo. 2012) (incompetency); United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1090
(8th Cir. 2011) (insanity); Shellito v. State, 121 So.3d 445, 456-58 (Fla. 2013) (death
penalty mitigation); Sanborn v. Parker, No. 99-678-C, 2011 WL 6152849, at *2-4 (W.D.
Ky. 2011) (death penalty clemency application). We address these issues broadly in a
paper-in-progress. See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "My Brain Is So Wired":
Neuroimaging's Role in Competency Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities
(work in progress; paper to be presented to the American Society of Criminology annual
conference, November 2016). On its potential application in cases involving competency
to be executed, see Michael L. Perlin, "Good and Bad, I Defined These Terms, Quite
Clear No Doubt Somehow ": Neuroimaging and Competency to be Executed after
Panetti, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 621, 688 (2010). On the potential admissibility of such
evidence on questions of witness truthfulness, see William A. Woodruff, Evidence ofLies
and Rules of Evidence: The Admissibility of J/MRI-Based Expert Opinion of Witness
Truthfulness, 16 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 105, 249 (2014).
2016]
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prisoner is competent to be executed. 19 The other author (AJL) is
currently working on an article about how attorneys can appropriately use
neuroscience as mitigating evidence and work to combat stereotypes and
prejudices against those with mental illness through therapeutic
jurisprudence.20 When we started on this journey, there was very little in
the legal literature to draw on, but this has changed dramatically over the
past few years.21 We hope that this article will offer some food for thought
as to how this "new science" may have an impact-either positive or
22
negative-on the criminal sentencing enterprise.
19 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "'His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill":
How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42
AKRON L. REV. 885 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases]; Michael L.
Perlin, "And I See Through Your Brain "': Access To Experts, Competency To Consent,
And The Impact OfAntipsychotic Medications In Neuroimaging Cases In The Criminal
Trial Process, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 [hereinafter Perlin, Criminal Trial Process];
Perlin, supra note 18; Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, Unasked (and Unanswered)
Questions About the Role of Neuroimaging in the Criminal Trial Process, 28 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 5 (2010); see also Michael L. Perlin, Considering Pathological
Altruism in the Law from Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Neuroscience Perspectives, in
PATHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM 156 (Barbara Oakley et al. eds., 2012).
20 See Alison J. Lynch, "'What a Tale My Thoughts Could Tell": The Potential
Therapeutic Benefits of Neuroimaging Evidence for Defendants with Mental Disabilities
in Death Penalty Mitigation (2016) (work in progress).
21 For a comparatively 
-early (2009) excellent review of the literature, see Stacey A.
Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
469, 470-71 n.8 (2009). See, e.g., Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law,
97 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 2055 n.77 (2013) (citing multiple sources), which is discussed in
Mark Kelman, Intuitions, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1301 n.21 (2013). Among the most
important recent additions to this area of law and policy literature in this area are: A
PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies
eds., 2012); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2012); and THE RESEARCH
NETWORK ON LAW & NEUROSCIENCE, www.lawneuro.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
22 On why neuroimaging evidence should be allowed as an aid to defendants, see
Adam Teitcher, Weaving Functional Brain Imaging into the Tapestry ofEvidence: A
In the Wasteland of Your Mind
Our title comes from Bob Dylan's "apocalyptic,, 23 song, When the
Night Comes Fallingfrom the Sky, in which Dylan sings: "You'll find
me/In the wasteland of your mind/When the night comes falling from the
sky."24 Elsewhere in the song, Dylan sings, "I can see through your walls,"
"This time I'm asking for freedom/Freedom from a world which you
,,25deny," and "I can't provide for you no easy answers.. Wastelands (or,
per T.S. Eliot, "waste lands",26) are vital in Dylan's lyrics, and here, we
have our own wasteland: the vast discrepancies between scientific findings
Case for Functional Neuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
355 (2011). On why neuroimaging evidence should be allowed as an aid to the
prosecution, see Bradley Muhs, Fighting the Unfair Fight: Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and the Need for Neuroimaging Evidence In Rape Trials, 35 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 215 (2014). On the potential misreading of neuroimaging by jurors, see So Yeon
Choe, Misdiagnosing the Impact ofNeuroimages in the Courtroom, 61 UCLA L. REV.
1502, 1505-1508 (2014). For an earlier article on how caution needs to be used in
admitting neuroimaging evidence, see Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role
ofNeuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 501 (2007).
There is some empirical evidence that lay people are more likely to believe negative
explanations of behavior when they are supported by neuroimages than positive
explanations without neuroimages. See, e.g., Deena Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure
of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 475 (2008).
23 HOWARD SOUNES, DOWN THE HIGHWAY: THE LIFE OF BOB DYLAN 362-65 (2001);
Aidan Day, Dylan's Judgment, 39 AM. STUD. SCANDINAVIA 84, 98 (2007).
24 BOB DYLAN, WHEN THE NIGHT COMES FALLING FROM THE SKY (Columbia
Records 1985), available at http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/when-night-comes-
falling-sky.
25 id.
26 For a discussion of the similarities between the two works, see Anne Margaret
Daniel, In The Waste Land of Your Mind: High Modernism Out on Highway 61, 2
MONTAGUE STREET (Summer 2010), available at
http://www.annemargaretdaiel.com/in the waste land ofjour mind high moderni
sm out on ighway_61_121893.htm. See T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTELAND (1922),
available at http://www.bartleby.com/20]/1.html.
2016]
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and hypotheses and the legal interpretation of these findings.27 In this
paper, we seek to close this gap and bring the legal field more into
compliance with modern criminology and behavioral science. A large part
of that work will be sorting through what is known about the biological
nature of criminal behavior, and where that fits in sentencing, to provide
answers to those hard questions and issues that Dylan references (as to
lack of "easy answers," the "den[ial]" of the (real) world, the quest for
freedom). Another part will be educating attorneys and researchers alike
on how best to integrate these two worlds, and move beyond the wasteland
to find clarity in the middle ground.
I. ON SENTENCING
As one author has written: "Concerns about arbitrariness and
unjustifiable disparities in criminal sentencing prompted Congress to enact
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which eliminated nearly most of the
[sentencing] discretion that federal judges had historically possessed. 28
Sentences were characterized as "unpredictabl[e] [and] unjustifiable" and
judicial discretion was similarly characterized as "unfettered., 29 The 1984
27 See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging
for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 222, 229 (2013) (discussing how "complications arise from discrepancies in the
meaning of crucial terms such as validity and reliability between law and science."). For
a fascinating analysis in the field of environmental law and science, see Deborah M.
Brosnan, Symposium, Science, Law, and the Environment: The Making of a Modern
Discipline, 37 ENVTL. L. 987, 987 (2007) (calling for the recognition "that science and
law are intertwined," and advocating "the development of a new modem discipline that
trains students to be fluent in science, law, and policy in order to better meet today's
environmental needs.").
21 Mark A. Klugheit, "'Where the Rubber Meets the Road": Theoretical Justifications
vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SYRACUSE L. REv. 803, 811
(2002).
29Id. at 812.
[Vol. 4:304316
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Sentencing Reform Act 30 was thus enacted in an attempt to bring about a
measure of regularity and uniformity in federal sentencing procedures 1
Under the Act, a series of permissible sentencing ranges-via the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines-was created for each federal criminal offense. 32
There were some departures allowed. Most importantly, for the purposes
of this paper, the sentencing court initially was allowed to depart from the
prescribed ranges where "(1) the defendant committed the offense while
suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the
significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the
commission of the offense33. . . . [but not if] the significantly reduced
mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other
intoxicants. 34 In such cases, a lower sentence "may be warranted" to
30 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)). See generally
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833 (1992).
31PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 16-2.1.
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Quinones-Medina, 553 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2009);
United States v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 697, 702 (4th Cir. 1996).
3' GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 5k2.13. The Commission has defined
'reduced mental capacity' to include volitional impairments, meaning conditions
affecting the ability to control behavior despite knowing that it is wrong." See id. at cmt.
n. 1, as discussed in Amanda R. Evansburg, "'But Your Honor, It's in His Genes'" The
Case for Genetic Impairments as Grounds for a Downward Departure under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1565, 1580 (2001). The case law is
strangely unhelpful in fleshing out this definition. For rare examples in which courts have
sought to clarify the term, see United States v. Harris, 1994 WL 683429, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) ("[A] recurrent failure to resist impulses, if carried to such an extreme as to be
measurable by professionally articulated diagnostic criteria, may qualify for consideration
under the Guideline"); United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[I]n
combination, the defendant's near retardation, his vulnerability, his efforts at
rehabilitation, and the incompetence reflected in the execution of the crime warrant a
downward departure.").
2016]
Virginia Journal of Criminal Law
reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the
commission of the offense, as long as the defendant's criminal history
"does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public." 35 The
constitutionality of these Guidelines was then upheld in Mistretta v.
United States. 
36
In the years after the Mistretta decision, however, dissatisfaction
emerged with regards to the rigidity of the Guidelines, and the Supreme
Court subsequently "radically altered Guidelines practice. 37 First, in
Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court struck down the Washington
state sentencing guidelines as unconstitutional. 38 There, the Supreme
39Court applied its earlier ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey to hold that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by a
sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to impose a sentence above the
statutory maximum based on facts neither admitted by the defendant nor
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.40 Blakely and Apprendi thus
On the interrelationship between this section of the Guidelines and the policy
statement of § 5H 1.3 see THOMAS HUTCHINSON ET AL., COMMENTS ON MENTAL AND
EMOTIONAL CONDITIONS (POLICY STATEMENT), FED. SENT. L. & PRAC. § 5H1.3 (2015)
(Section 5H 1.3 states: "Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining
whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in combination with
other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case
from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.").
35 Goossens, 84 F.3d at 700. See generally Kirk Houser, Downward Departures: The
Lower Envelope of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 361 (1993);
Donald Wayne, Chaotic Sentencing: Downward Departures Based on Extraordinary
Family Circumstances, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 443 (1993). For relevant early cases, see
United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bradshaw,
1999 WL 1129601 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
36 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
37 Perlin, supra note 12, at 900.
3' 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
39 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-05.
[Vol. 4:304318
In the Wasteland of Your Mind
paved the way for the Supreme Court's rejection of the Mistretta standard
in United States v. Booker,41 replacing it with a new formulation making
the Guidelines "advisory. 42 Both scholars and congressional leaders saw
Blakely and its progeny as a backlash against the severity of mandatory
minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.43
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GUIDELINES
How have courts dealt with these issues? 44 In several pre-Booker
cases, courts have invoked the Guidelines to reduce a defendant's sentence
based on his reduced mental capacity. In one case, a history of
41 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
42 Perlin, supra note 12, at 885. For an important example of judicial dissatisfaction,
see United States v. Delgado, 994 F. Supp. 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (Weinstein, J.)
("Placing this defendant with minimal mens rea in prison for the long period suggested
by the Guidelines would not serve society well").
43 Joseph E. Kennedy, Cautious Liberalism, 94 GEO. L.J. 1537, 1557 (2006).
44 The material infra accompanying notes 45-56 is largely adapted from Perlin,
supra note 12, at 895-99.
45 See also United States v. Lighthall, 389 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that a
finding of compulsive disorder in the defendant warranted a downward departure for
diminished capacity under the Guidelines); United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding posttraumatic stress disorder is type of mental disorder that can support
mental disability-based downward departure); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d
Cir. 1990) (upholding departure from Guidelines based on defendant's likely "extreme
vulnerability" in a correctional facility); United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding defendant's near retardation, vulnerability, efforts at
rehabilitation and incompetence warranted downward departure). But see United States v.
Valdez, 426 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding defendant's IQ did not warrant a downward
departure for diminished capacity under the Guidelines); United States v. Sheehan, 371
F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding downward departure was not granted for diminished
capacity under the Guidelines even though he had been diagnosed with substance
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schizophrenia and other emotional disturbances was seen as sufficient to
meet the Guidelines' criteria, thus warranting a sentence reduction.46 In
another case, the Ninth Circuit admonished that it was not necessary to
find that the defendant's reduced mental capacity amounted to "but-for
causation" in order to reduce a sentence; what was necessary was that his
diminished mental capacity "comprised a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense. 47
dependence and anti-social personality disorder); United States v. Greenfield, 244 F.3d
158 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding depression does not warrant a downward departure).
46 United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp. 861, 867-68 (D.D.C. 1989); see also United
States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Chambers, 885 F. Supp. 12
(D.D.C. 1995); United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1990); Cantu, 12 F.3d
at 1517 (deciding that a finding of post traumatic stress disorder can be considered
diminished capacity leading to a downward departure); United States v. Doering, 909
F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting upward departure where evidence reflected need for
psychiatric care); United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Brown, 1997 WL 786643 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1997) (granting downward departure for
diminished mental capacity). But see United States v. Riggs, 370 F.3d 382, 391 (4th Cir.
2004) (finding diminished mental capacity did not entitle the defendant to a downward
departure because the defendant posed a serious threat of violence and there was a need
to protect the public); United States v. Soliman, 954 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding
that because the defendant's mental condition did not contribute to the commission of the
crime, nor did he have a significantly reduced mental capacity, downward departure was
not warranted).
For other cases involving defendants with other mental disabilities, see, e.g., United
States v. Follette, 990 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Neb. 1998) (bipolar disorder and post-traumatic
stress disorder); United States v. Brown, 1997 WL 786643 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (severe
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder).
47 United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1990). See also United
States v. Perry, 173 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997) (departures
granted); United States v. Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413 (D. Me. 2007) (defendant
departure granted); United States v. Shore, 143 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass. 2001)
(downward departure granted); United States v. Boeka, 8:06CRl15, 2006 WL 3780400
(D. Neb. Dec. 20, 2006). See generally United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178 (2d Cir.
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Other cases have found, variously:
* That the "precise degree" to which the defendant's mental illness
contributed to his criminal activity need not be "pinpoint[ed] or
quantif[ied] ;,,48
* That a defendant's assertion of the insanity defense did not
preclude a downward departure; 49 and
* That a defendant's post-arrest efforts at drug rehabilitation might
warrant such a departure.50
2005); United States v. Fluehr, 1995 WL 37527 at *5 (E.D. Pa.), amended, 1995 WL
106878 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 74 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1995).
41 United States v. Royal, 902 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D.D.C. 1995); see also United
States v. Sutherland, 2001 WL 1502913, at *9 (W.D. Va. 2001) (finding no "foolproof
method" to determine how much diminished capacity is needed to contribute to an
offense); Leandre, 132 F.3d at 805 (Guidelines "require[] no more than that the
defendant's reduced capacity be a contributing factor, to some degree, to his offense.").
49 United States v. Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Barnes, 46 F.3d 33 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sam, 467 F.3d 857 (5th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Taylor, 483 F.
Appx. 992 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that pleading the insanity defense does not preclude a
downward departure for acceptance of responsibility). But see GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 9, at § 3E. 1.1 (a) ("If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.").
50 See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 201 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Whitaker, 152 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. Eisinger, 321 F. Supp. 2d 997 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (granting
defendant a horizontal departure for overcoming her drug addiction and becoming a
lower risk of reoffending); United States v. Rutherford, 323 F. Supp. 2d 911 (E.D. Wis.
2004) (granting a departure for his drug rehabilitation); United States v. Perella, 273 F.
Supp. 2d 162 (D. Mass. 2003) (entitling defendant to a downward departure for his
extraordinary drug rehabilitation); United States v. Jones, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (E.D.
Wis. 2002) (finding that defendants extraordinary drug rehabilitation warranted
downward departure); United States v. Wilkes, 130 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D. Mass. 2001)
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In other words, some courts have taken seriously their power to
mitigate sentences based on "reduced mental capacity." But generally,
determinations to not depart from the Guidelines are upheld, by way of
example, in cases in which:
* The underlying crimes were violent and the defendant's violent
criminal record raised the possibility that he would be a threat to
public safety;
51
* The court did not find the defendant's disability so significant as to
warrant such a reduction;
52
* The defendant's behavior was not sufficiently aberrant; 53
* The court did not find defendant's "extraordinary post-arrest
efforts" at drug rehabilitation sufficient to warrant such a
reduction;
54
(granting defendant a downward departure for post-arrest efforts to rehabilitate himself
from his drug addiction); United States v. Kane, 88 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084 (1 lth Cir. 1994); United States v.
Braxton, 19 F.3d 1385 (1 1th Cir. 1994). See generally United States v. Malone, 78 F.3d
518 (11th Cir. 1996).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United
States v. Jackson, 56 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Benson, 7 F.3d 226 (4th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Bhagavan, 911 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ind. 1995), affd, 116 F. 3d 189 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Fluehr, 1995 WL 37527 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Marquez, 827
F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 1502 (2d Cir. 1994).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Castano-Vasquez, 266 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2001);
United States v. Constantine, 263 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Benally,
215 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 2000); Thompson v. United States, 2000 WL 821711 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
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* There was no connection demonstrated between the defendant's
diminished capacity and the commission of the crime;55 or
* The court felt that the defendant did not take sufficient
56responsibility for his role in the criminal offenses in question.
In short, although mental capacity plays some role in criminal
sentencing, it is by no means a dispositive factor. The cases that do take it
into account appear to be idiosyncratic, unmoored by any overarching
theory or by any uniform reliance on the sorts of external factors about
which science potentially may offer some insights, other than the
acknowledgment that there may be some biological basis for the behavior
at issue.
II. BIOLOGICAL BASES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
While the possibility for incorporation of insights from the
scientific community 57 in the sentencing process is ever growing, it is
54 United States v. Zeigler, 1 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., United States
v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Williams, 37 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1994), vacated, 65 F.3d 301 (1995).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 49 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v.
White, 71 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Shaoul, 1996 WL 120713
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 104 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1996).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 64 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Artim, 944 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.J. 1996); United States v. Amerson, 864 F. Supp. 458
(M.D. Pa. 1994).
For a survey of representative cases in all instances, see Perlin, supra note 12, at
897-98 n.78.
57 Here, we mean "scientific community" in its broadest relevant sense (psychiatry,
psychology, neuroscience, and all related fields). This is an important reminder because
of the fluidity and rapidity of scientific findings. While in some ways this may seem like
semantics, the distinction is important: what we know is less likely to change as rapidly as
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essential to be cautious and to constantly take note of what we know, as
opposed to what we hypothesize, about the scientific and
neurophysiological understanding of mental state as related to criminal
behavior.58 We will be more effective researchers, scholars and advocates
if we proceed with caution.59
what we hypothesize, since generally hypotheses are always being tested and retested,
and by their nature must be more specific and contained.
51 See, e.g., Joelle Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law,
42 AKRONL. REv. 717, 722 (2009):
Neuroscience will certainly change law. In fact, neuroscience
research has the potential to influence a vast range of legal decisions.
To the extent that neuroscientists increasingly make claims that
neuroimaging reveals cognition, even the most unimaginative
prognosticator might predict: (1) the preliminary investigative use of
neuroimages to enhance witness interviews and police interrogations
(including but not limited to lie-detection), (2) jury selection based on
neuroimages that appear to reveal jurors' unconscious stereotypes or
biases, and (3) arguments about intent or sentencing based on
neuroimage-enhanced explanations of behavior and predictions of
dangerousness.
It is probably worth noting that, per Professor Stephen Morse, "neuroscience... is purely
mechanistic and eschews folk-psychological concepts and discourse," concepts that are
frequently at the heart of criminal law policy and decision-making. Stephen Morse,
Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Promise of Neuroscience,
99 MARQUETTE L. REV. 39, 58 (2015).
On the use of neuroimaging evidence in lie detection in general, see Dominique J.
Church, Neuroscience in the Courtroom: An International Concern, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1825 (2012); Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 27; Francis X. Shen & Owen D.
Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62 MERCER L. REV.
861 (2011).
59 See, e.g., Joshua Buckholtz & David Faigman, Promises, Promises for
Neuroscience and Law, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY 861, 861 (Sept. 22, 2014) (promising
neuroscience "elides fundamental conceptual issues that limits [its usefulness] for law.").
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The desire to understand the biological bases of violent or criminal
behavior did not appear with the advent of neuroimaging technology.
Scientific "trends" of assessing criminality began long before today's
technology with the introduction of phrenology,60 Franz Joseph Gall's
attempt to explain away complex behavior based on the size and location
of skull protuberances.61 While we no longer introduce measurements of a
defendant's head during the mitigation phase of a sentencing hearing,
attorneys still seek to offer physiological explanations for the criminal
actions of their clients.62 The most notorious example of this was the
alleged use of the "Twinkie defense" in the murder trial of Daniel White,
who killed Harvey Milk in San Francisco and was subsequently convicted
of manslaughter.63 Although the fact that the defendant ate excessive
amounts of Twinkies was not purported to be the cause of the killing, "it
60 See David Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject Lessons
from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 981 (2008) ("[P]hrenology qualifies
as the poster child for historical scientific error.").
61 See, e.g., Donald Simpson, Phrenology and the Neurosciences: Contributions of
F.J. Gall and J.G. Spurzheim, 75 ANZ J. SURGERY 475 (2005); General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("An example of 'junk
science' that should be excluded.., as too unreliable would be the testimony of a
phrenologist who would purport to prove a defendant's future dangerousness based on the
contours of the defendant's skull."), discussed in Stacey Tovino, Imaging Body Structure
andMapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 203 &
n. 111 (2007); S. Zola-Morgan, Localization of Brain Function: The Legacy of Franz
Joseph Gall (1758 1828), 18 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 359 (1995).
62 Laura S. Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image:
An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 183-
84 (2007). Developments in the Supreme Court's treatment of mitigating evidence in
death penalty cases are traced in Perlin & Lynch, supra note 14.
63 People v. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d 270, 277 (1981).
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attained the dubious status of an urban legend, which is repeatedly trotted
to demonstrate the imagined bankruptcy of the criminal justice system. 64
Today, the argument can certainly be made that fMRIs, PET scans
65and SPECT scans constitute the tools of our "modern phrenology."
However, the researchers who posit that certain neurological
characteristics may correlate to antisocial behavior are, by and large, not
ready to take the stand and swear that this is the case for each individual
defendant.66 This is the crux of the division between modern science and
64 Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are,
and What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 725, 821 n.490 (2004). For a nuanced
analysis of the use of physiological evidence in criminal cases, see Deborah Denno,
Courts' Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases:
Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967 (2011).
65 Based on the type of evidence an attorney seeks to introduce (structural or
functional), there are several different tools at his or her disposal. Functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) most effectively measures function, in this case, blood flow
and activity in the brain while a person is engaged in a task. See Teneille Brown & Emily
R. Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: The Use ofJ/MRI as Evidence ofMens Rea, 22
J.L & HEALTH 319, 322 (2009). Positron emission tomography (PET) scans operate
similarly to fMRIs, looking indirectly at functional assessments of cognitive activity
while an individual engages in a task. See Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging
Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1255-56 (1997). Single-
photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) scans also measure blood flow to
regions, and attempt to determine "active" areas of the brain. However, they have been
deemed to not be "generally accepted" in some courts due to how little is known
comparatively about the validity of SPECT for analyzing criminality. See People v. Yum,
3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (depublished) (barring SPECT evidence
offered to show diminished capacity because SPECT had not become "generally
accepted" for that purpose).
66 John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence
for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 188, 191-98
(2008) (describing potential legal barriers to the admission of neurological evidence).
The advent of new technologies that promise to allow investigators to peer into the
minds and memories of alleged wrongdoers or even innocent witnesses poses grave
constitutional questions concerning the rights of the individual to privacy and bodily
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the law: a researcher who publishes a paper speculating that a relationship
may exist between two variables does not expect that paper to be the final
word on the matter;67 consider the contrast with Justice Jackson's famous
dictum from over sixty years ago: "We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final. 68 A researcher
will want replication studies with larger groups, more diverse groups, the
same initial group, and randomized groups to validate his hypothesis,
which will be fluid and easily changed throughout this process. This is not
the case in the law. A judge issuing an order expects that order to be the
final word, subject, of course, to further appeals. Unlike in scientific
discovery, there is no room for, or encouragement of, consistent validation
of a finding in the law.6 9
integrity and protection against self-incrimination. Balanced against these individual
rights, scientific advantages in determining the truth reflect the legitimate interests of
society and the legal system in determining the veracity of defendants and witnesses and,
ultimately, achieving justice. Id. at 198; see also C.C. Meltzer et al., Guidelines for the
Ethical Use of Neuroimages in Medical Testimony: Report of a Multidisciplinary
Consensus Conference, 35 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 632 (2014), available at
http://www.ajnr.org/content/35/4/632.full.pdf.
61 See David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The
Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
685, 689 (2000) (explaining that the law must understand that "science is sometimes
tentative and uncertain, that scientists often disagree, that scientists have other interests
(in their careers, in helping a client, in getting paid), and that once-established theories
are later replaced.").
6" Brownv. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
69 Id.; see also Bennett L. Gershman, Now You See It, Now You Don't:
Depublication and Nonpublication of Opinions Raise Motive Questions, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J.
36 (Oct. 2001) (articulating the idea within the law that " [b]y authoritatively declaring
and interpreting a general principle of law, the opinion promotes stability, certainty, and
predictability.").
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This difference between the disciplines creates problems when
science continues to evolve and the law stays stagnant, 7 which is
precisely what has happened in the case of neuroimaging. Science has
begun to understand when it is most appropriately used, based on the
field's evolving knowledge of the relationship between structural and
functional brain abnormalities, and antisocial behavior. The law has failed
to take this into account because, by its very nature, it has been unable to
issue decisions with the same rapidity as the neuroscientists. 71 Also, our
70 Courts, of course, have inveighed against the notion that the law is stagnant. See,
e.g., U.S. ex rel. Kimball v. Cathedral Rock Corp., 2010 WL 147810, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
2010) ("Assumption that the law has remained stagnant is neither wise nor satisfies an
attorney's ethical obligation to his client."); Mercier v. Bradley Real Estate, 251 P.3d 673,
at *4 (Kan. 2011) ("The law is never stagnant. It expands and contracts with the events of
each case where it is applied.").
71 Paradoxically, the Supreme Court has considered neuroscientific evidence in the
narrow area of capital sentencing in the context of whether juveniles or certain persons
with mental disabilities can be executed. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (deciding those under the age of 18 are less morally culpable for their conduct
because of neurological differences from adults, and so are ineligible for the death
penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (deciding those with intellectual
disabilities are also ineligible for the death penalty based on neurological differences).
But see Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 480-81 (2007) (reversing the decision
granting a capital defendant an evidentiary hearing to explore, inter alia, the neurological
damage the defendant likely suffered as a result of fetal alcohol syndrome, characterizing
such mitigation evidence as "weak"). See generally Peggy Sasso, Implementing the
Death Penalty: The Moral Implications ofRecent Advances in Neuropsychology, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 765 (2007). For a discussion of other problems with the law's use of
social science, see Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2005) (describing the law's movement
towards understanding the causes of human behavior as "haphazard, idiosyncratic and
unsystematic."). However, there has been little "spillover" from decisions such as Roper
and Atkins to sentencing in "ordinary" cases. The developments in the law as it relates to
the determination of intellectual disability for purposes of assessing whether an
individual is competent to be executed speaks to this. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986
(2014), discussed in this context in Michael L. Perlin, "'Merchants and Thieves, Hungry
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federalist system means that, absent a constitutional decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court, there is no likelihood of uniformity,72 and the notion of
inter-rater reliability will inevitably be missing.73
Today, what we understand about the biological bases of criminal
behavior remains in flux. 74 That is not to say that we do not have some
generalities that can guide us, but, to borrow a term from the criminal law,
we do not have "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." In some cases, we
may not even have "clear and convincing" evidence of the link between
brain and behavior; 75 all we may have is guessing and speculation.
for Power": Prosecutorial Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty
Trials ofDefendants with Mental Disabilities, WASH. & LEE L. REV. (2016)
(forthcoming); Michael L. Perlin, "'Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind":
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of "'Ethnic Adjustments " in Death Penalty Cases
ofDefendants with Intellectual Disabilities, AMER. U. L. REV. (2016) (forthcoming).
72 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (" [T]jhe happy incident[] of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.").
73 On the need for inter-rater reliability in any procedure that relies on clinical
opinion, see American Educational Research Association, American Psychological
Association, National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999 Standards for
Educational and Psychological Testing (1999), discussed in this context in 1
DEMOTHENES LORANDOS & TERENCE CAMPBELL, CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTS IN THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES §5:4 (2015).
74 Compare Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience
and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 56 (2006)
("Though criminal behavior seldom is due to any single biological, psychological, or
sociological cause, we are closer to realizing the early criminologist's dream of
identifying the biological roots of criminality."), with Joan Vogel, Biological Theories of
Human Behavior: Admonitions of a Skeptic, 22 VT. L. REV. 425, 426 (1997) ("How can
we legitimately theorize about the biological roots of criminal behavior when the very
concept of crime differs cross-culturally?").
75 For a cautionary perspective, see Daniel Goldberg, Against Reductionism in Law
& Veuroscience, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 321 (2012).
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What follows is a brief primer on the current understanding of
neuroscience as it relates to the neurophysiology of criminal or antisocial
behavior, and why it is potentially so significant for the inquiries we
'76address in this paper. First, it is important to understand that
neurophysiology can refer to either structure or function of the brain.77
Generally used in the context of abnormalities, the term "structural" refers
to a change or an existing abnormality in the gross anatomical structure of
the brain, such as loss of volume or formation defect.78 Many studies have
sought to examine whether structural abnormalities in various parts of the
brain are connected to an increased likelihood of antisocial behavior.79
76 See Jana Buflkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies ofAggressive and
Violent Behavior: Current Findings and Implications for Criminology and Criminal
Justice, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 176, 186 (2005) ("Within an interdisciplinary
framework that values neuroscience, virtually every essential sociological factor
elaborated by criminologists, structural and processual, acquires a greater potential to
explain aggression and/or violence and influence policy making."). On the ways that law
and neuroscience have become an "established interdisciplinary area of law," see Oliver
Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L &
Soc. SCI. 61, 82 (2010).
77 For a more detailed explanation of the differences between structural and
functional neurophysiology and imaging, see Choe, supra note 22, at 1510-11.
781Id. at 1511.
79 See, e.g., David J. Schretlen & Anne M. Shapiro, A Quantitative Review of the
Effects of Traumatic Brain Injury on Cognitive Functioning, 15 INT'L REV. PSYCHIATRY
341 (2003); Larry J. Siever, Neurobiology ofAggression and Violence, 165 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 429, 432 (2008) (explaining that lesions and tumors in prefrontal cortex or
temporal lobe have been implicated in aggressive and violent behavior); Joseph M.
Tonkonogy & Jeffrey L. Geller, Hypothalamic Lesions and Intermittent Explosive
Disorder, 4 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 45, 45-47 (1992)
(proposing hypothalamic lesions in the brain as factor in aggressive behavior); Sabrina
Weber et al., Structural Brain Abnormalities in Psychopaths A Review, 26 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 7, 13 (2008) (describing the link between frontal lobe damage and aggressive
behavior). For the most recent research, see, e.g., V. Leutgeb et al., Brain Abnormalities
in High-Risk Violent Offenders and Their Association with Psychopathic Traits and
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Functional abnormalities are defined as an abnormal neurophysiological
reaction to a stimulus, like decreased or increased levels of neurological
activation inconsistent with the activation levels observed in the general
population. 80 Researchers continue to focus on whether behavior may be
consistent with observed functional abnormalities that are apparent
through neuroimages. 81
While there is still an ongoing debate about the particular areas of
the brain that can lead to criminal behavior, 82 most research seems to
focus on two particular areas: the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala.
83
Based on the direction of current research, attorneys are more likely to
introduce neuroimaging evidence that implicates abnormalities in these
areas.84 However, as new research and understanding about neural activity
emerges, areas such as the hippocampus, the angular gyms, the anterior
Criminal Recidivism, 308 NEUROSCIENCE 194 (2015); Lee Ellis & Anthony W. Hoskin,
The Evolutionary Neuroandrogenic Theory of Criminal Behavior Expanded, 24
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 61 (2015); Liza JM Comett, Using Basic
Neurobiological Measures in Criminological Research, 4 CRIME SCI. 7 (2015). In a work-
in-progress, the co-authors will discuss this issue in greater depth. See Alison J. Lynch &
Michael L. Perlin, The Law and Treatments for Individuals with Traumatic Brain Injury:
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective (work in progress).
"o Yaling Yang & Adrian Raine, Prefrontal Structural and Functional Brain Imaging
Findings in Antisocial, Violent, and Psychopathic Individuals: A Meta-Analysis, 174
PSYCHIATRY RES. 81 (2009); see also, Leutgeb et al., supra note 79.
"' See Choe, supra note 22, at 1511-12.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 85-101. For a review of various theories and
imaging studies, see R. J. R. Blair, Neurobiological Basis of Psychopathy, 182 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 5 (2003).
13 See generally Redding, supra note 74.
14 Choe, supra note 22, at 1510-15 (describing current research). For a review of
studies revealing that areas associated with violent and/or aggressive behavioral histories
are located in the prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal regions, see Bulkin &
Luttrell, supra note 76.
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cingulate, and the temporal cortex may also become more widely
acknowledged as potentially related to criminal behavior.
85
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is generally described as the structure
that controls executive function, or "the ability to coordinate thought and
action and direct it toward obtaining goals., 86 Coordinating thought and
action is directly linked to making judgments and regulating behavior,
which are both implicated in antisocial behavior.87 Additionally, many of
the traits of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), including moral
decision-making, processing reward and punishment information,
inhibiting responses, exhibiting proper social conduct, and processing
social and emotional information are correlated with PFC activity. 88
Evidence linking a defendant's particular behavior to abnormalities
in the PFC may be used to demonstrate a physiological basis for the
15 See Martina Jovey et al., The Relationship between Hippocampal Asymmetry and
Temperament in Adolescent Borderline and Antisocial Personality Pathology, 26 DEV. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 275 (2014) (building on previous work reporting "significant
associations between atypical hippocampal asymmetry and poor behavioral regulation.");
see also R. J. R. Blair, The Roles of Orbital Frontal Cortex in the Modulation of
Antisocial Behavior, 55 BRAIN & COGNITION 198 (2004); Abigail A. Marsh et al.,
Empathic Responsiveness in Amygdala and Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Youths with
Psychopathic Traits, 54 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 900 (2013); Jesus Pujol et al.,
Breakdown in the Brain Network Subserving Moral Judgment in Criminal Psychopathy,
7 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 917 (2012); Adrian Raine & Yaling
Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC.
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203 (2006).
16 E. K. Miller & J. D. Wallis, Executive Function and Higher-Order Cognition:
Definition and Neural Substrates, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA NEUROSCIENCE 99, 99 (2009).
17 Blair, supra note 82, at 5-6.
Andrea L. Glenn et al., Neuroimaging in Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality
Disorder: Functional Significance and a Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis, in
NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 81
(Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012).
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defendant's antisocial behavior.89 Here, the issue is susceptibility and
control. An individual with diminished or abnormal PFC activity could
arguably be less culpable for his behavior, given that his impulse control is
physiologically limited by a structural abnormality in the PFC.90
Abnormalities in the PFC can be either structural or functional, and
both can be measured by different types of neuroimaging studies.91
However, research has generally focused on structural abnormalities like a
reduction in gray matter, rather than functional abnormalities throughout
the PFC, with one study finding that individuals diagnosed with ASPD
showed on average an 11% reduction in gray matter volume as compared
to those without an ASPD diagnosis.92 This grows in importance in light
of the reality that "jurors are less suspicious of expert testimony that is
premised on organic (rather than psychodynamic) evidence." 93 This type
" Choe, supra note 22, at 1511; see also id., at 1513-14 (reporting on studies that
reveal that that individuals with antisocial personality disorder have an 11 percent
reduction in gray matter volume in comparison to normal controls, that repeat violent
offenders also have reduced gray matter in the prefrontal cortex, that functional
abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex are been implicated in aberrant behavior, and that
violent offenders who are nonpsychotic also show reduced blood flow in the prefrontal
cortex) (citing, inter alia, Antonia S. New et al., Blunted Prefrontal Cortical
18Fluorodeoxyglucose Position Emission Tomography Response to Meta-
Chlorophenylpiperazine in Impulsive Aggression, 59 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 621,
628 (2002); Henrik Soderstrom et al., Reduced Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in Non-
Psychotic Violent Offenders, 98 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 29, 40 (2000); Jari
Tiihonen et al., Brain Anatomy of Persistent Violent Offenders: More Rather Than Less,
163 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 201, 206 (2008)).
90 Choe, supra note 22, at 1512.
91 Id. at 1510.
92 Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced
Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder, 57 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY
119, 125 (2000).
93 Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases, supra note 19, at 901 (citing, inter alia, Phoebe
Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 81, 84 (1984)).
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of finding is demonstrative of the type of evidence that may be introduced
through neuroimaging. Generally, this kind of structural abnormality is
fairly easy to demonstrate through the use of structural imaging like MRI,
as it is static and does not depend on whether an individual is engaged in a
task or behavior at the time of the scan.
There is reliable data that suggests that functional abnormalities in
the PFC can also contribute to criminal or violent behavior.94 In one study,
individuals with "impulsive aggression" demonstrated lower levels of
neurological activation in the PFC during neuroimaging. 95 Generally,
activation and function refer to measurable blood flow to the area during
the time an individual is performing a specific task that implicates that
96area.
94 Alex B. Morgan & Scott 0. Lilienfeld, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Relation
Between Antisocial Behavior and Neuropsychological Measures of Executive Function,
20 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 113, 113 (2000) (finding that, on review of 39 studies,
"[o]verall, antisocial groups performed .62 standard deviations worse on [executive
function] tests than comparison groups; this effect size is in the medium to large range.").
The PFC is responsible for executive functioning, and tests often refer to executive
function scores to show someone's propensity to act violently or impulsively (traits
which are frequently marked by lower scores on executive function tests and demonstrate
functional abnormalities of executive function). See, e.g., Diana Fishbein,
Neuropsychological Function, Drug Abuse, and Violence: A Conceptual Framework, 27
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 139 (2000).
95 Antonia S. New et al., Blunted Prefrontal Cortical 18Fluorodeoxyglucose
Positron Emission Tomography Response to Meta-Chlorophenylpiperazine in Impulsive
Aggression, 59 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 621, 628 (2002). For a more recent review of
cognitive neuroscience models of psychopathy, including findings on decreased
amygdala responses and orbitofrontal cortex responses, see R. J. R. Blair, Neuroimaging
of Psychopathy andAntisocial Behavior: A Targeted Review, 12 CURR. PSYCHIATRY REP.
76 (2012). On the complex questions that arise in the context of proof of causation in this
context, see, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic
Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203 (2007).
96 It is interesting to note that none of the articles cited supra in notes 89-95,
virtually all written by individuals who are well known in the field of neuroscience for
[Vol. 4:304334
In the Wasteland of Your Mind
In addition to the PFC, the amygdala is often studied in
conjunction with antisocial behavior.9 7 Though the behaviors themselves
may manifest in similar ways as those present in individuals with PFC
abnormalities, the root cause is neurologically separate. 98 One important
and relevant function of the amygdala is its role in processing social
emotions, like fear and guilt, rather than coordinating and executing
behaviors, like the PFC. 99
The amygdala is key in helping an individual develop empathy,
which is related to future behavior that an individual would perceive as
harmful or hurtful to others. 100 Dysfunction of the amygdala, either
structural or functional, can potentially result in antisocial traits since the
individual is unable to learn empathy if he is unable to understand the
effect of his actions on others.10 1 Besides empathy, the amygdala is also
this research, have been cited in any legal decision, including those cases that directly
discuss the use of neuroimaging evidence.
97 Blair, supra note 82.
98 Id.
99 Glenn et al., supra note 88, at 86-87.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., R. J. R. Blair et al., A Selective Impairment in the Processing of Sad and
Fearful Expressions in Children with Psychopathic Tendencies, 29 J. ABNORMAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 491 (2001).
The authors find the most thoughtful legal commentator on the role of empathy in
the law is Professor Susan Bandes. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Empathy andArticle III:
Judge Weinstein, Cases and Controversies, 64 DEPAUL L. REv. 317 (2015); Susan A.
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 361
(1996).
On the relationship between neuroscience and empathy, see generally C. Daniel
Batson, These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena, in THE
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 3 (Jean Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009), and R.
J. R. Blair & Karina S. Blair, Empathy, Morality, and Social Convention: Evidencefrom
the Study of Psychopathy and Other Psychiatric Disorders, in THE SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 139 (Jean Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009).
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linked to understanding remorse after taking actions that are perceived as
harmful to others. Dysregulation can cause a lack of remorse that is
frequently present in individuals diagnosed with ASPD. 102
Like those found in the PFC, abnormalities in the amygdala may
be both structural and functional. One study found that individuals with
antisocial traits had a demonstrably reduced volume in this area of the
brain. 103 There is also evidence to suggest that functional abnormalities in
the amygdala contribute to antisocial behavior. One study found that
individuals who scored higher on a test designed to predict antisocial
tendencies also showed decreased activation in the amygdala while
performing a specific task related to empathy than normal control
subjects.10 4 Additionally, studies have shown that individuals who have
been clinically diagnosed with ASPD or were found to demonstrate
psychopathic1 0 5 traits showed less amygdala activation when processing
102 Glenn et al., supra note 88, at 86-87.
103 Yaling Yang et al., Localization ofDeformations Within the Amygdala in
Individuals With Psychopathy, 66 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 986, 990 (2009).
104 James K. Rilling et al., Neural Correlates of Social Cooperation and Non-
Cooperation as a Function of Psychopathy, 61 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1260, 1270
(2007).
105 The term "psychopath" has a confusing, muddled history in clinical psychology
and psychiatry. Often conflated with antisocial personality disorder (APD), psychopathy
is not a recognized clinical diagnosis in the DSM-V (or any previous edition), but
researchers have identified distinct traits, both behaviorally and neurophysiologically,
that separate a "psychopathic" individual from an "antisocial" individual. Robert Hare's
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) is a widely recognized diagnostic tool that
identifies three areas in which psychopaths manifest personality traits-interpersonal
defects like grandiosity and deceitfulness, affective deficits like lack of empathy, and
impulsive and criminal behaviors. Antisocial personality disorder, on the other hand,
overlaps to some extent with psychopathy but is characterized by a history of criminal,
often violent, behavior, which is not seen to the same extent in Hare's psychopathy. For
more on the distinctions between psychopathy and APD see Robert D. Hare, Hare
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (2d ed.) (PCL-R), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 348-50 (Brian Cutler ed., 2008), and R.J.R. Blair, Veurocognitive Models of
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stimuli related to the affect of others. 106 Those with this lower activation
activity may have greater difficulty processing social emotions related to
affect and response, like fear, guilt, and remorse.
Similar arguments for mitigation based on neuroimages exist for
individuals with PFC abnormality and amygdala abnormality. These
arguments in essence state that their particular structural or functional
abnormality or irregular neurological activity makes them less culpable for
their criminal behavior, 10 7 perhaps analogizing from the Supreme Court's
decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia.1l 8 However, it is
important to point out that there is no proven way of demonstrating
Aggression, the Antisocial Personality Disorders and Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROL.,
NEUROSURG. & PSYCHIATRY 727 (2001). However, there continues to be debate about
the components of a psychopathy diagnosis, with some researchers, such as Jennifer
Skeem, concluding that criminality is merely a correlate of psychopathy, rather than an
ingrained component necessary for clinical diagnosis. See Jennifer L. Skeem & David J.
Cooke, Is Criminal Behavior a Central Component of Psychopathy? Conceptual
Directions for Resolving the Debate, 22 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 433 (2010). The
authors presented a work-in-progress on this topic to the American Society of
Criminology in Washington DC in November 2015, titled 7 See What is Right and
Approve, But I Do What is Wrong": Psychopathy and Punishment in the Age of
Neuroimaging.
106 See, e.g., Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by
Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677, 682 (2001).
107 Compare Middlebrooks v. Colson, No. 3:03-00814, 2014 WL 3817238 (M.D.
Tenn. 2014) (denying habeas petition due to procedural defects-defendant offered
habeas petition in support of claim of ineffectiveness of counsel claiming that defense
counsel should have presented fMRI or PET scan evidence based on known
neurophysiological abnormalities resulting from trauma in order to bolster mitigation
case), with Gilley v. Morrow, 246 F. Appx. 519, 524 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to present evidence of
defendant's severe organic brain dysfunction as mitigating evidence during sentencing).
10" Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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whether the dysfunction has existed since before the period of time when
the crime in question was committed. 109
There are many other studies that focus on the PFC and amygdala,
as well as other regions and subregions of brain structures that assist in
regulation of emotion and behavior. 110 Some other areas of the brain that
researchers currently believe may influence antisocial behavior include the
temporal cortex, the corpus callosum, the nucleus accumbens, the
amygdala-hippocampal complex, and the angular gyrus. 111 These studies
generally use some form of brain imaging to demonstrate either structural
or functional abnormality, and that image is frequently what is presented
to the judge and jury. While the data may be reliable in the scientific
community, reliability in the context of the law requires a different set of
standards, especially with the addition of laypeople being the decision-
makers as to the validity of evidence as applied to an individual case.
112
109 Brown & Murphy, supra note 65, at 1130 C[W]e cannot presently read someone's
mind to determine her mens rea at the time of the crime.").
110 See, e.g., Raine & Yang, supra note 85, at 203.
111 Id.
112 A discussion of the scope of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. is beyond the scope
of this paper. 509 U.S. 579, 586-89 (1993) (deciding that a scientific theory or instrument
does not need to be generally accepted within the scientific community before it can be
utilized by an expert witness). But it must be noted that there is a significant disparity in
legal decision making in such cases; that is, in Daubert cases the prosecutor's position is
sustained (either in support of the questioned expertise or in opposition to it) vastly more
often than is that of defense counsel's. See Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases supra note 19,
at 906-07 (citing D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99, 105-08 (2000)); see
also Susan Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert." Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the
Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007) ("The game of scientific evidence looks
fixed.").
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When evidence is presented to jurors, it is crucial to underscore
what exactly is being shown, and what is merely being implied. 113 For
example, attorneys must understand and communicate to jurors, that there
is no definitive test to determine whether abnormalities like gray matter
reduction or decreased activation levels were present at the time an
individual engaged in the antisocial behavior in question, unless a separate
MRI was done at that time. 114 This is a critical issue for attorneys and
judges to understand. Brain imaging can only provide information about
the state of a defendant's brain at the time that the imaging is done. Any
further extrapolation about whether a particular abnormality was present at
the time of the criminal action in question remains speculative, and falls
well below the legal standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." It is
significant here to keep in mind that "psychotropic drugs affect functional
imaging of the brain," and that the effects of such drugs "are not always
short-lived."
' 115
Recently there has been an even greater increase in cases seeking
to introduce evidence of functional or structural abnormalities through the
use of neuroimaging technology. 116 Its use in this context raises its own
series of questions and concerns about validity and reliability in a legal
context, as well as its value as a persuasive tool. 117 In a recent article,
113 See, e.g., Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us
About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 589 (1997).
114 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 65, at 1130. This is certainly not the only
question that jurors need consider in this context, but it is inevitably a crucial one.
115 Donald Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 89, 92 (2003) (discussing how "psychotropic drugs affect functional
imaging of the brain'); see also Perlin & McClain, supra note 19, at 13-14.
116 A Westlaw search reveals over 350 criminal cases that reference neuroimaging,
and shows that cases over the past three years have made up almost a third of all
searchable criminal cases referencing neuroimaging. See infra note 139.
117 See, e.g., John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging:
The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Defense's Use of Veuroimages in Capital
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Professor Stephen Morse concludes firmly, "At present, neuroscience has
little to contribute to more just and accurate criminal law policy, doctrine,
and individual case adjudication."'1 18
With the continuing improvements in the understanding of
correlations between brain and behavior, it is likely that judges will see an
increase in cases involving neuroimaging evidence. Attorneys may feel
pressured to introduce this evidence by clients who have heard of its
previous success, by other attorneys who begin to believe that this is a new
standard of best practice, 119 and even by professional associations that
continue to tout the value and importance of this method of mitigation. 
120
Cases Lessonsfrom the Front, 62 MERCERL. REV. 909, 910 (2011) (discussing "serious
risks" in "overreliance on imaging" and concluding "neuroimaging is not an investigative
tool; it is a confirmatory and explanatory tool."); Walter Glannon, The Limitations and
Potential of Neuroimaging in the Criminal Law, 18 J. ETHIcs 153 (2014) ("[I]maging has
questionable probative value because it does not directly capture brain function or a
defendant's mental states at the time of a criminal act."); Stephen J. Morse, Brain
Overclaim Redux, 31 LAw & INEQ. 509, 512 (2013) ("Despite the astonishing advances
in neuroimaging and other neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisticated
causal knowledge of how the brain works generally, and we have little information that is
legally relevant."); Nick J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea
Defense: No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357, 382 (2011).
"" Morse, supra note 58, at 74.
119 See, e.g., Alison K. Bennett & Jason Bloom, Neurolaw: Brain Waves in the
Courtroom, 75 TEX. B.J. 280, 280 (2012) ("Neurolaw research-a combination of
neuroscience and law-is positioned to change the law and its application, as we further
our understanding of what drives behavior and how people make decisions, including
judges and jurors.").
120 See, e.g., John Matthew Fabian, Forensic Neuropsychological Assessment and
Death Penalty Litigation, 33 CHAMPION 24, 25 (April 2009) (The Champion is the lead
publication of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); Kristen Gartman
Rogers & Alan DuBois, The Present and Future Impact of Neuroscience Evidence on
Criminal Law, 33 CHAMPION 18, 18 (April 2009) ("Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) is the latest and most promising technique for measuring and depicting
brain function. If the technique's potential is fully realized, it could transform our
criminal justice system.").
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Used appropriately, with the understanding that it must only supplement
other already-existing evidence rather than stand-alone as the only proof
needed, neuroimaging based on what is known about the biological bases
of behavior may be an effective strategy for mitigation.
However, while the science behind neuroimaging continues to
improve, attorneys and judges must also continue to understand how
neuroimaging evidence is perceived and internalized by jurors, 121 and, at
least in the cases of federal criminal sentencing, by judges. 122 Here there is
a gap between the current reality of the meager caselaw and the promise of
what might come, especially if criminologists make an affirmative effort,
in the words of Professor Leo as cited before, to help "close the justice
gap." 
123
III. NEUROIMAGING IN THE COURTROOM
We now turn our attention to the singular role of neuroimaging
evidence, to consider both the ambiguities and the ambivalences of such
evidence. 124
121 See, e.g., E. Spencer Compton, Not Guilty by Reason of Neuroim aging: The Need
for Cautionary Jury Instructions for Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Trials, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 333, 335-36 (2010).
122 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on
Neuroscience, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 747
(3d ed. 2011).
123 Leo, supra note 14, at 26.
124 Portions of the following section are adapted from Perlin & McClain, supra note
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A. THE AMBIGUITIES AND AMBIVALENCES OF NEUROIMAGING
EVIDENCE
Although commentators bravely assert that neuroscience seems
"advanced enough to enter forensic psychiatry," 125 that "[a]dvances in
neurobiological research methods allow one to address the nature and
biological basis of human behavior,"' 126 and that jurors can be counted on
to critically evaluate such evidence,127 a cluster of other factors forces us
to think seriously about how neuroimaging evidence will be construed by
fact-finders,1 28 both in the context of the validity of the science and the
validity of its application.
These factors can be identified as "visualization, reductionism, the
attribution heuristic, and the impact of a belief in "the CSI effect."
1 29
Visualization refers to the ways that the visual "allure"1 30 can "dazzle" and
125 Joachim Witzel et al., Neurophilosophical Perspectives of Neuroimaging in
Forensic Psychiatry-Giving Way to a Paradigm Shift?, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 115
(2008).
126 Jurgen L. Muller et al., Disturbed Prefrontal and Temporal Brain Function
During Emotion and Cognition Interaction in Criminal Psychopathy, 26 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 131, 131 (2008).
127 Dov Fox, Brain Imaging and the Bill ofRights: Memory Detection Technologies
and American Criminal Justice, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34, 36 (2008).
12" For a critical article related to the topic of this presentation expressing concern
about the insertion of neuroscience into a criminal justice and sentencing system that
'may be overburdened, overpoliticized, undertheorized, and lacking sufficient checks and
balances on institutional competency and legitimacy," see Emily R. Murphy, Paved with
Good Intentions: Sentencing Alternatives from Neuroscience and the Policy of Problem-
Solving Courts, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 83, 83 (2013).
129 Perlin, Criminal Trial Process, supra note 19, at 9-10. These factors are
discussed in-depth in Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases, supra note 19, at 892-94.
130 Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 62, at 182.
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"seduc[e]" jurors 1"' in ways that are "inappropriately persuasive." 1
Reductionism refers to the ways that neuroimaging testimony has the
meretricious capacity to "reduce[] psychosocial complexity." 133 The
attribution heuristic refers to the way that we seek to attribute human
behavior, in the words of Laura Khoshbin and Shahram Khoshbin, "to a
physical source in the head." 134 The "CSI effect" refers "to the way that
we believe that jurors demand the 'money shot' of hard forensic evidence
in all trials, even though valid and reliable evidence as to the reality of that
belief 'is scant."' 135 Importantly, a recent study concluded that
131 Id. at 183, 185; see also Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain
and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging,
33 AM. J. L. & MED. 271, 289 (2007). See generally Weisberg et al., supra note 22.
132 Neil Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility
and Persuasiveness ofJ./IRI, 2 INT'L J.L. IN CONTEXT 233, 247 (2006).
133 Id. at 248.
134 Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 62, at 171. Heuristics are "cognitive-
simplifying devices that distort our abilities to consider information rationally." Michael
L. Perlin, "'Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate
the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343,
365 n. 127 (2013), and sources cited. As an example, through the vividness heuristic, a
'single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon
which rational choices should be made." Michael L. Perlin, "'The Borderline Which
Separated You From Me ": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of
Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1375, 1417 (1997). The
attribution heuristic teaches that we "overattribute others' behavior to the kinds of people
they are rather than to the circumstances in which they find themselves." Feigenson,
supra note 132, at 248 (citing RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980)). But see Weisberg et al.,
supra note 22, at 476 (suggesting that the "seductive details effect" is a more likely
explanation for juror behavior than use of heuristic reasoning devices).
135 Perlin, Criminal Trial Process, supra note 19, at 9-10; see also Wendy Brickell,
Is It the CSI Effect or Do We Just Distrust Juries?, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10 (2008); Tom Tyler,
Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and
Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006); Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror
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neuroscience, like other types of scientific evidence, is subject to cognitive
dynamics. It is "subject to the same sort of cognitive dynamics as other
types of scientific evidence;" it is seen as persuasive when it is in line with
an individual's prior beliefs, but is perceived negatively when it conflicts
with those beliefs.1 36 This is not unlike other research that demonstrates
how judges "teleologically" privilege evidence of mental illness "(where
that privileging serves what they perceive as a socially-beneficial value)
and subordinate (where that subordination serves what they perceive as a
similar value)." 1 37 This remains, in the end, an area fraught with ambiguity
and contradiction. 
1 38
B. EXPANDED USE OF NEUROIMAGING IN THE COURTS
While sentencing is an area where attorneys frequently use
neuroscience evidence as mitigation, it is clear that its popularity has
expanded well beyond the realm of sentencing. As of 2006, one study
found 133 reported state and federal opinions containing reference to PET
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the "'CSI Effect"
Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331 (2006).
136 Nicholas Scurich & Adam Shniderman, The Selective Allure of Neuroscientific
Explanations, 9 PLOS ONE (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id= 10. 137 i/journal.pone.0 107529.
137 Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's
Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV.
589, 599-600 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Mirror]; Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 422 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Healing] (discussing JOHN Q. LA
FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH
LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (1992)).
13" For recent experimental research, concluding that neuroscience evidence led
novices to judge "bad explanations" of behavior more favorably, see Weisberg et al.,
supra note 22, at 475, 477 (urging that there are "more reasons for caution' when
applying such evidence to "social issues.").
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and SPECT scans."' Eight years later, that number is sure to have more
than doubled. As of April 2016, a search on Westlaw (a legal database of
all decided cases) found that there were at over 350 state and federal
criminal cases that referenced neuroimaging evidence.
140
There is little doubt that jurors are inclined to accept certain types
of scientific evidence without close scrutiny, 141 and that many lawyers are
not sufficiently prepared to cross-examine certain types of expert
witnesses. 142 By raising the issues that are the focal point of this paper, we
139 Feigenson, supra note 132, at 237. It is also interesting to note that in 85 out of
the 133 cases, the party presented or sought to present it to judges, not to juries.
Additionally, in 89 of the 133 cases, the question of whether the SPECT or PET evidence
should be admitted or excluded was addressed. Out of those eighty -nine cases, the
neuroimaging evidence was admitted in seventy-three of them. Id.
140 List of State and Federal Criminal Cases Referring to Neuroimaging, WESTLAW
NEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (search used the following criteria: (PET or SPECT or
fMRI) /10 (scan or image!); next to "cases" followed the "view all" hyperlink; used
filters to narrow to criminal cases) (accessed on Apr. 14, 2016). This number, of course,
does not include civil cases.
141 Cf Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(expressing fear that testimony in death penalty case as to defendant's likely future
dangerousness lends "an aura of scientific infallibility [that] may shroud the evidence and
thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny."). But see Brickell, supra note
135, at 16-17 (questioning the empirical evidence for the proposition that jurors
inappropriately defer to forensic experts).
142 E.g., Norman Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment. Training
Attorneys to Cope With Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 15 (1978); Steven
Wilkins, Know Thine Expert. Expert Witnesses in Medical Malpractice Cases:
Supplementing Disclosure with Online Investigation, 76-DEC N.Y. ST. B.J. 31 (2004).
On a related question, see Joel D. Lieberman et al., Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors
Recognize the Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of
Forensic Evidence?, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 27 (2008).
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hope to rearticulate these concerns in a new context: that of neuroimaging
evidence. 143
It is obvious from this discussion that the law has yet to come to a
clear understanding of when the use of neuroimaging evidence is
appropriate. 144 Since this is still a question that ethicists, scientists, and
knowledgeable attorneys are debating, it is unsurprising that we see such
dramatically different outcomes in each state, region and district. The
danger in failing to adopt a unified set of standards is that "junk science"
will continue to slip through the cracks, presented by attorneys who do not
think about the implications of the evidence and allowed in by judges who
do not understand the science. 
145
However, when used appropriately and introduced as supported by
the weight of credible science behind it, neuroimaging evidence may
provide alternatives for individuals otherwise already facing difficulties
getting a fair hearing. People with brain injuries or neurological
impairments leading to symptoms of mental illness already face additional
biases. 146 Leveling the playing field by introducing visible evidence of
143 One of the authors considers this issue carefully in the context of the ways that
jurors assess neuroscience evidence in insanity cases. See Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases,
supra note 19, at 887 (questioning "to what extent will such evidence-apparently less
inherently susceptible to falsification-have on jurors whose profound suspicion of
mental state opinion testimony is well-documented.").
144 Moreno, supra note 58, at 725-26.
145 On how judges can enhance appropriate uses of science in court, see, e.g., Joelle
Moreno, Beyond The Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans That Divide
Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REv. 1033, 1088-91 (2001).
146 On the impact of such bias in cases involving the death penalty, see Saby
Ghoshray, Capital Jury Decision Making: Looking Through the Prism of Social
Conformity and Seduction to Symmetry, 67 U. MIAMI L. REv. 477, 499 n.93 (2013). On
the meaning of and inherent bias in sanism, see infra note 151.
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mental disorder, just like any other physical impairment, may help to
provide a benefit to individuals seeking a fair hearing. 147
IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
148
Over the past two decades, one of the most significant legal
theoretical developments has been the creation and dynamic growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence. 149 One of the co-authors (MLP) has described
this development:
[T]herapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for
assessing the impact of case law and legislation,
recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law [] can have
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. 150 The
147 See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing how jurors respond more
favorably to organic than to psychodynamic evidence).
14" This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin, "'Yonder Stands Your
Orphan with His Gun ": The International Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 301 (2013), and
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "'All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental
Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014).
149 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996);
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005);
David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17
(2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, § 2-6, at 2-43 to 2-66. Wexler first used the
term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David
B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992).
150 See Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases, supra note 19, at 912; see also, Kate Diesfeld
& Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND
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ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or
should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential
while not subordinating due process principles. 151
David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent tension inherent in this
inquiry must be resolved: "the law's use of mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice
concerns."' 152 As one of us (MLP) has written elsewhere, "[A]n inquiry
DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds., 2006) (for a
transnational perspective).
151 Michael L. Perlin, "'The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside ": Mental Health Courts,
Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 1, 7-8 (2013) (internal
citations updated); Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won't Even Say
What It Is I've Got": The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment
Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005); see also Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is
Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain ": Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of
Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia,
83 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2008). On how therapeutic jurisprudence "might be a redemptive
tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of 'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist faqade,'
see Perlin, Mirror, supra note 137, at 591 (quoting, in part, MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE
HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 301 (2000)). See also, Ian Freckelton,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of
Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008).
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other
irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism,
sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On "'Sanism ", 46
SMU L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1992). On how sanism "permeates all aspects of mental
disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability law system," see, e.g.,
Perlin & Lynch, supra note 148, at 259.
152 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts ofLegal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
generally David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE
PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
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into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns
trump' civil rights and civil liberties."
1 53
Therapeutic jurisprudence "look[s] at law as it actually impacts
people's lives" 1 54 and assesses law's influence on "emotional life and
psychological well-being." 155 Therapuetic jurisprudence mandates that
"law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing
anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent
with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and
wellness." 156 From therapeutic jurisprudence, we gain "a new and
distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into the law
and its applications."1 57 Therapeutic jurisprudence is ". . . a sea-change in
ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more
distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . [emphasizing]
psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism."'158 It thus supports
an ethic of care. 159
153 Perlin, Healing, supra note 137, at 412 (emphasis in original); Michael L. Perlin,
Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline: Mental Disability Law, Theory and
Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
154 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing
With Victims of Crime, 33 NOVAL. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
155 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft
Spots and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION 45 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
156 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
157 Freckelton, supra note 151, at 576. It is also part of a growing comprehensive
movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically optimal
ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. Susan Daicoff,
Afterword: The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within The Comprehensive Law
Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 155, at 465.
151 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical
Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also, Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming
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Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation
and voluntariness, 16 0 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants
must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to
a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has
genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the
litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.
When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense
of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the
outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences the
proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the
part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very
process that engendered the end result or the very judicial
pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In
Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges for the Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING
PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The
Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the
Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REv. 605, 605-06 (2006).
159 See e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 158, at 605-07; David B. Wexler, Not
Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's
Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L.
REv. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra note 158. The use of the phrase dates to CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
160 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REv. 601,
627 (2008). On the importance of "voice," see also, Freckelton, supra note 151, at 588.
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general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 161
A core central principle of therapeutic jurisprudence is a
commitment to dignity. 162 In a recent article about dignity and the civil
commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum
embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus
specifically on this issue of voice: "When procedures give people an
opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are
explained to them their views taken into account, and they substantively
feel less coercion." 163
The question to be posed here is this: in those instances in which
criminal sentencing decision-making considers neuroscientific tests and
evidence, to what extent does it comport with therapeutic jurisprudence
principles? 164 In one of the first pieces about therapeutic jurisprudence
ever published, David Wexler suggested that "sentencing guidelines and
practices ... be examined from a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective to
161 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002)
(internal citations omitted). See generally, AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
162 See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
MODEL 161 (2005). On dignity in the sentencing process generally, see MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL
DISABILITY LAw 214-15 (2013).
163 Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 51 (2015).
164 On how therapeutic justice can encourage the development of holistic treatment
regimes that hold offenders to a "scientifically rational and legally appropriate degree of
accountability," see Richard L. Nygaard, The Dawn of Therapeutic Justice, in THE
SCIENCE, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS: APPLICATION TO
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 23-1, 23-12 (Diana H. Fishbein ed., 2000).
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shed light on whether they promote or impede rehabilitation." 165
Subsequently, Georgia Zara has thoughtfully and carefully considered
how biologically based criminological research can be integrated into a
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective on studying the behavior of
offenders,1 66 but there has been virtually no scholarship written about this
specific issue. 167 It is sadly clear that the entire body of scholarship
165 David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the
Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
759, 768 n.35 (1993). On how mandatory sentencing schemes limit therapeutic
jurisprudence activity by legal actors, see David B. Wexler & Michael D. Jones,
Employing the "Last Best Offer'" Approach in Criminal Settlement Conferences: The
Therapeutic Application of an Arbitration Technique in Judicial Mediation, 6 PHOENIX L.
REV. 843, 850 (2013). On the application of therapeutic jurisprudence to sentencing in
other nations, see, e.g., Michael S. King, Geraldton Alternative Sentencing Regime:
Applying Therapeutic and Holistic Jurisprudence in the Bush, 26 CRIM. L.J. 260 (2002)
(Austl.).
166 Georgia Zara, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as an Integrative Approach to
Understanding the Socio-Psychological Reality of Young Offenders, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
127, 128 (2002). There has been no follow-up in the legal literature to this insight of
Professor Zara's.
167 One of us (MLP) noted this, with regards to the insanity defense some seven years
ago. See Perlin, Insanity Defense Cases, supra note 19, at 913 ("There has been,
however, almost no therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship as of yet on the question that I
am addressing here: what are the therapeutic jurisprudence implications of greater
reliance on neuroimaging testimony in cases in which the defendant raises a non-
responsibility defense?"). David Wexler has more recently called on researchers to
consider the parallel question of neuropsychology and law as they relate to the solitary
confinement for juvenile offenders. David B. Wexler, New Wine in New Bottles: The
Need to Sketch a Therapeutic Jurisprudence "'Code'" of Proposed Criminal Processes
and Practices, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REv. 463, 469 n. 15 (2014). Issues that relate
specifically to the relationship between the juvenile justice system and brain neuroscience
are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Perlin supra note 148; Alison Burke,
Under Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the Criminal Justice System, 34
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 381 (2011).
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referred to in this section has fallen on deaf ears in the contexts of criminal
sentencing. 168
Courts have regularly ignored the potential role of therapeutic
jurisprudence in sentencing decisions. 169 The danger in failing to
recognize the precedential value of decisions from other jurisdictions is
the creation of an inevitably divided legal system, in which a person in one
jurisdiction has the ability to introduce evidence that another individual
elsewhere could not. 
170
161 Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, there has been great interest shown in
the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and the work of problem-solving
courts. For a sampling of scholarship by some prominent problem-solving judges, see,
e.g., Deborah Chase & Peggy Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court Assignment
and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209 (2009); Michael D. Jones,
Mainstreaming Therapeutic Jurisprudence into the Traditional Courts: Suggestions for
Judges and Practitioners, 5 PHOENIXL. REv. 753 (2012); Michael S. King, Should
Problem-Solving Courts Be Solution-Focused Courts?, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1005 (2011);
Willliam Schma et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Using the Law to Improve the Public's
Health, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 59 (2005); Ginger Lemer-Wren, Mental Health Courts:
Serving Justice and Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577 (2010).
169An ALLCASES Westlaw search of "'therapeutic jurisprudence' /p sentence!"
reveals only one case, and that simply cites an article with the words "therapeutic
jurisprudence" in the title. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1200 (11th Cir.
2010). For a recent case that, without naming therapeutic jurisprudence, uses its
principles in a decision recommending "best practices" to sentencing judges asked to
impose conditions of supervised release, see United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th
Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.), as discussed in David B. Wexler, Moving Forward on
Mainstreaming Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Ongoing Process to Facilitate the
Therapeutic Design and Application of the Law, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: NEW
ZEALAND PERSPECTIVES V, xiii-xiv n.28 (Warren Brookbanks ed., 2015), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2564613.
170 Judicial decisions about neuroimaging in the criminal trial process appear to all be
the classic "n of 1-"judges decide these cases with little attention being paid to other
similar cases or the scientific evidence that may support such testing (and subsequent
testimony). See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 18. This is not uncommon in case law
involving issues related to persons with mental disabilities in the criminal trial process.
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This is especially troubling for individuals with mental illness and
traumatic brain injury (TBI), 171 since the recognition of a physical
component of their disability could help to comport with therapeutic
jurisprudence principles of dignity, voice and validation. 172 The ability to
adequately present evidence to represent physical illness is generally
available to individuals who have a physical difference; it can even be
used as mitigation evidence. 173 The opportunity for individuals with
mental illness and brain injury, who are already facing additional
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and Godinez: Competency Before and After
Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 297, 309-10 (2003) (discussing how "surprising" is the
failure of most of the cases in these categories "to consider carefully" other decisions in
the same substantive sub-areas of competency law).
171 While traumatic brain injury has long been a public health concern, it has also
been recognized as having significant effects on the personality and behavior of
individuals who sustain these injuries. While not necessarily appropriate as evidence for
an insanity defense (for the same temporal reasons addressed above), introduction of a
defendant's TBI could prove to be an effective tool during mitigation, in order to provide
a clue as to why he may have performed the crime with which he was charged. A finding
of TBI can also help to demonstrate an individual's current cognitive and emotional
functioning, which will be important for a decision-maker to consider during sentencing.
For a review of available techniques for imaging TBI and introducing it in criminal cases,
see Lydia D. Johnson, Guilty or Innocent? Just Take a Look atMy Brain Analyzing the
Nexus Between Traumatic Brain Injury and Criminal Responsibility, 37 S.U. L. REV. 25,
27-28 (2009). On the forensic significance of PET scans in TBI cases, see Jane Moriarty
et al., Brain Trauma, PET Scans and Forensic Complexity, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 702
(2013).
172 Lynch & Perlin, supra note 79. The only scholarship about the relationship
between therapeutic jurisprudence and TBI appears to be Evan R. Seamone, Dismantling
America's Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to Treat, Rather Than Merely Punish,
Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to Discharge from the Armed Forces, 37 NOVA
L. REV. 479 (2013).
171 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d) (West 2012) (treating as a mitigating
circumstance when " [t]lhe defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder
that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the
defendant is amenable to treatment.").
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discrimination and bias, 174 to have another avenue through which to
present legitimate evidence should be granted in the appropriate cases. If
used correctly, neuroimaging evidence could serve as a valuable tool for
implementing therapeutic jurisprudence principles in these cases. 175
Scholars have recently called for greater and more sophisticated
research in assessing how sentencing reforms have empirically affected
the severity of punishment and how the exercise of discretion in
sentencing relates to the structures of sentencing laws.1 76 This call for
additional research must be contextualized with the reality that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines significantly increased the power of prosecutors, as
the choices of what charge should be brought against a defendant would
more conclusively determine the sentence. 177 Similarly, others (including
174 On the impact of stigma and sanism on cases involving individuals with mental
disabilities in the criminal process, see, for example, PERLIN, supra note 162; MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES
(2013); Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431 (1995);
Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role
of "'Mitigating " Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
239, 241 (1994).
175 See Murphy, supra note 128, at 117 ("With opportunities for invasive, long-
lasting, and highly-impacting treatments coming soon from neuroscience, drug courts
must revisit the true roots of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework: a focus on
empirically verifiable results with respect for due process protections for personal liberty
and autonomy.") (citing Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing
the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 439, 447 (1999)).
176 See Rodney Engen, Assessing Determinate and Presumptive Sentencing Making
Research Relevant, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 323 (2009).
177 William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV.
373, 382 (1995); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing andRacial
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judges) have called for evidence-based sentencing to replace judicial
discretion in the sentencing process, 1 8 and have urged that risk
assessment measures be incorporated into such decision-making. 
179
How does this "fit" within the focus of this paper? Two years ago,
Professor David Farrington noted that "[m]ost early longitudinal studies
focused on individual, family, peer, and school factors, but in recent years
there has been increased research on biological influences on
offending," 180 adding that "dopamine transporter and receptor genes
influenced neurocognitive skills (in males), which in turn influenced
ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) and antisocial
behavior." 181 Interestingly, Farrington-one of the leading scholars in this
field 182 -does not otherwise mention neuroscience or neuroscientific
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects ofBooker, 123 YALE L.J. 2,
13-14 (2013).
171 See, e.g., Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting
Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1416 (2008).
179 Jordan M. Hyatt, Mark H. Bergstrom & Steven L. Chanenson, Follow the
Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 4 (April
2011). Professor Sonja Starr has critiqued the current risk-prediction instruments used by
some state courts on the basis that their practice of basing punishment on group
membership promotes disparity as likely unconstitutional. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization ofDiscrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
803 (2014). On the controversy attendant to the use of risk assessment instruments in
sexually violent predator act decision-making, see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L.
Perlin, "Far from the Turbulent Space ": Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the
Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually iolent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 125 (2015).
1"0 David Farrington, Longitudinal and Experimental Research in Criminology, 42
CRIME & JUST. 453, 470 (2013).
1 Id. at 471.
112 See, e.g., David Farrington, Methodological Quality Standards for Evaluation
Research, 587 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 49 (2003); Brandon Welsh & David
Farrington, Toward an Evidence-Based Approach to Preventing Crime, 578 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158 (2001); Georgia Zara & David P. Farrington, Assessment of
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evidence elsewhere in this article. Perhaps even more interestingly, this
article has only been cited once in a law review, and not at all in case
law. 183
Much of the literature that focuses on criminological evidence,
predictor variables, and recidivism predictions, while considering criminal
companions, criminogenic needs, criminal history, race, age, substance
abuse history, family structure and criminality, gender, socio-economic
status, and a host of other variables, makes no mention of neuroscientific
tests of evidence. 184 Even though more and more cases, especially in the
criminal context, continue to use this type of evidence, neuroscientific
evidence has not been adequately taken into account from a criminological
perspective. Failure to include this in contextual studies about the root
causes of criminality hurts both researchers and attorneys. 185 Since judges
and attorneys often use reliable, validated data in their presentations of
evidence, comprehensive and peer-reviewed research on the
Risk for Juvenile Compared with Adult Criminal Onset Implications for Policy,
Prevention, and Intervention, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 235 (2013).
113 See Anders Kaye, Excuses in Exile, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 485 n. 153
(2015).
"' See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329 (2011); Jason Matejkowski &
Michael Ostermann, Serious Mental Illness, Criminal Risk, Parole Supervision, and
Recidivism: Testing of Conditional Effects, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (2015) (on
recidivism and actuarial testing); Daryl G. Kroner & Annie K. Yessine, Changing Risk
Factors that Impact Recidivism: In Search of Mechanisms of Change, 37 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 321 (2013) (on a cognitive-behavioral model of recidivism prevention for
individuals with antisocial traits).
111 For a review of the dangers posed by allowing the inclusion of junk science, see
Joseph M. Price & Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the Courtroom: Causes, Effects
and Controls, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 395, 397 (1996) ("Introduction of unreliable scientific
evidence increases the chance that a jury will arrive at an unjust verdict."). See generally
Dennis, supra note 17; Gianelli, supra note 17.
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criminological validity of neuroscience would fill a void that continues to
lead to confusion and misrepresentation of scientific data.
It is not controversial to say that our criminal law system is not
aligned with an "ethic of care,"' 186 nor is it a surprise to learn that
defendants feel they are often without voice in circumstances that are
certainly not voluntary. We believe, however, that if the law were to
embrace scientific discovery, not slavishly, but thoughtfully, the aims of
therapeutic jurisprudence-to let us "look at law as it actually impacts
people's lives" 187 and to focus on the law's influence on emotional life and
psychological well-being1 88-would more likely be met.
V. CONCLUSION
Neuroscience, and our knowledge of neurophysiology, remains in
flux. The legal profession needs to consider this when evaluating how
novel scientific evidence is used to influence criminal cases.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines propose a method of
sentencing based on a grid, with little room for judicial opinion on the
matter. However, neuroimaging may offer an opportunity for a more
therapeutic sentencing framework that takes into account mitigating
evidence. Evidence of traumatic brain injury or abnormalities found in the
structure or function of brain regions associated with criminal behavior
may offer insight to the defendant's current mental state, or provide
additional factors to take into account when exploring his mental state at
the time of the crime.
However, the legal profession will need continuing education
about the efficacy of this technology, especially given the differences
186 See GILLIGAN, supra note 159.
117 Winick, supra note 154, at 535.
1 Wexler, supra note 155, at 45.
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between how scientific research works, with its constantly-changing
theories and hypotheses, and how the law works, with a judge issuing a
decision and creating a binding precedent.
Given the current research available, it is clear that fMRIs, PET
scans, and SPECT scans still have a limited place in our criminal justice
system. However, the law must anticipate and acclimate to the very real
possibility that these technologies will continue to improve at a rapid rate.
This will require a proactive effort on the part of judges and attorneys to
become educated, and to apply Daubert and Frye tests appropriately 189
and not teleologically 190-each time a new trend in neuroscience emerges.
In this way, the legal profession can also ensure that individuals who
already face extreme bias-those with mental illness-have the chance to
present valid and reliable scientific evidence that may help to mitigate
harsh criminal sentences.
The field of criminology can act as a bridge between science and
the law;191 criminologists can "translate" scientific discoveries about the
Daubert is discussed supra note 112. Under the test created in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), novel scientific evidence is admissible when
the relevant scientific community has generally accepted the reliability of the underlying
theory or principle. See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 179, at 139-41.
190 See Rozelle, supra note 112 (citing to Professor Rozelle's conclusion that "the
game of scientific evidence looks fixed."). On the dangers of teleology in mental
disability law decision-making, see Perlin, Mirror, supra note 137, at 599-600.
191 See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas, David N. Cox & Christopher D. Webster, Violence
Risk Assessment: Science and Practice, 4 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 149
(1999); Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform
Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315 (1996). On the related
question of the failure of criminology to concern itself sufficiently with issues related to
the international human rights implications of the ways that criminal defendants are
treated in forensic psychiatric facilities, see Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "'The
Distant Ships ofLiberty": Why Criminology Needs to Take Seriously International
Human Rights Laws that Apply to Persons with Disabilities, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2692109.
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correlates of antisocial behavior into clear analyses that can be understood
and incorporated by attorneys in their presentation of evidence to jurors or
judges. 192 The value of undertaking this evidence through a criminological
lens is twofold: first, it will highlight important scientific findings and
their relevance to the law, and second, good criminological research will
serve as a filter, allowing only validated, reliable scientific evidence to
influence legal decision-making. This may allow for faster evolution of
the law where scientific evidence is concerned. The landscape can be
changed, and the "wasteland"-channeling the Dylan lyric that helps
provide the title for this paper-may not appear so vast if other disciplines
are willing to work to educate and inform the legal system on its approach
to scientific evidence.
192 On the potential role of criminologists doing research in the parallel area of false
confessions, see Leo, supra note 14.
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